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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PRICE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
A Utah Corporation, and 
DAVID ZSERAI, 
Defendant-Appellant. Case No. 20568 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
POINT II -
POINT III -
WHETHER THIS COURT ON APPEAL IS 
PRECLUDED FROM HEARING ISSUES 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A 
POST JUDGMENT MOTION. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY IT'S DENIAL OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED ON 
GROUNDS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
OF CAUSATION TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
WHICH WAS BASED ON DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO FURTHER 
VOIR DIRE THE JURY WITH REGARD TO 
POSSIBLE PREJUDICE. 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Responden t c l a i m e d damages f o r i n j u r y s u f f e r e d as 
a r e s u l t o f A p p e l l a n t s ' n e g l i g e n c e . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
T r i a l was h e l d t o a j u r y November 27 and 2 8 , 1984 . 
Judgment i n t h e amount o f $ 1 4 0 , 7 1 5 . 0 0 p l u s i n t e r e s t and 
c o s t s was e n t e r e d upon v e r d i c t o f t h e j u r y i n f a v o r o f 
R e s p o n d e n t . (Addendum 1 ) . A p p e l l a n t s moved f o r judgment 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , mo t ion 
f o r new t r i a l . F o l l o w i n g s u b m i s s i o n o f memoranda and 
o r a l a rgument by t h e p a r t i e s t h e t r i a l j u d g e r u l e d by memorandum 
d e c i s i o n d e n y i n g A p p e l l a n t s 1 m o t i o n s . (Addendum 8 ) . T h i s 
a p p e a l f o l l o w e d s a i d d e c i s i o n . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Responden t s e e k s an o r d e r from t h i s c o u r t a f f i r m i n g 
t h e j udgmen t and o r d e r o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , V i c t o r P r i c e , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d 
t o as Mr. P r i c e , c l a i m e d damages a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s - A p p e l l a n t s 
Utah Power & L i g h t Company and David Z s e r a i , h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o as U . P . & L . f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by Mr. 
P r i c e as a r e s u l t o f U.P.& L . f s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a 
(2) 
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a piece of heavy equipment which frightened the animal 
which Mr. Price was riding causing it to bolt. In an 
attempt to control the animal Mr. Price braced himself on 
the saddle with his right arm, pulled the rein with his 
left to turn the mule into a circle. Mr. Price suffered a 
nerve injury resulting in loss of use and shriveling of his 
right arm. (Trans. 62, 67, 68, 81). Jury trial was held 
November 27 and 28, 1984. The jury decided that U.P.&L.was 
907o negligent in the operation of heavy equipment on 
September 15, 1981. (Addendum 1). Negligence of U.P.& L. is 
not raised as issue on appeal and therefore will not be 
treated by Respondent in Statement of Fact. The jury also 
found that U.P.&.L.'s negligence was the proximate cause of 
damages sustained by Mr. Price. (Addendum 1). 
Prior to his injury Mr. Price had been a self-employed 
rancher for 45 years. (Trans. 45). Mr. Price had been 
treated through the years by chiropractors. Mr. Milton K. 
Thayn, chiropractor, first saw Mr. Price in January 1978. 
Mr. Price was complaining of a stiff neck. (Trans. 207), 
Dr. Thayn took x-rays, (Trans. 208), and gave a grip test 
(Trans. 210) finding weakness in both arms but found the 
right arm had more strength than the left. (Trans. 211). 
He diagnosed a thorasic sprain (Trans. 211) meaning injury 
to a muscle, ligaments and connective tissue. (Trans. 212). 
Following treatment which ended May 8, 1978 (Trans. 215) Dr. 
(3) 
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Thayn not iced a general improvement in a l l conditions 
previously noted in Mr. P r i ce . (Trans. 215). Dr. Thayn 
did not feel Mr. P r i c e ' s treatment required r e f e r r a l to a 
neurologis t and gave no t e s t s for neurologica l damage other 
than the grip t e s t s e a r l i e r re fe r red t o . (Trans. 216). Dr. 
Thayn t e s t i f i e d tha t in h i s opinion subsequent trauma would 
aggravate Mr. P r i c e ' s condition (Trans. 216) and that a 
r ide on a bol t ing mule such as Mr. Pr ice had, would cause 
injury to the neck. (Trans. 217). 
Mr. Price saw Ronald B. Sanders, Chiropractor in July 
1978 (Trans. 154) t e s t ed Mr. P r i c e ' s neck flexion and found 
i t l imi ted (Trans. 158-159) and examined x-rays previously 
taken (Trans. 161) and diagnosed t i g h t neck muscles. (Trans. 163). 
Dr. Sanders t rea ted Mr. Pr ice with soft t i s s u e and spinal 
manipulation (Trans. 163) u n t i l September 1979 (Trans. 166) 
and did not see him again u n t i l August 20, 1981 when he 
t r ea t ed Mr. Price by pu l l ing arid s t r e t c h i n g h i s neck. (Trans. 167) 
Similar treatment was given four times between August 20 and 
September 9, 1981. (Trans. 168). 
On September 16, 1981 Mr. Pr ice saw Dr. Sanders, t o ld 
him of the incident on the mule. (Trans. 169). At no time 
during h i s treatment of Mr. Pr ice did Dr. Sanders feel tha t 
h i s condition was such as to requi re medical treatment u n t i l 
December 1981 (Trans. 175) when the condit ion complained of 
on September 16, 1981 had not responded to treatment and 
(4> 
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de te r io ra t ion of Mr. P r i c e ' s r ight hand was noted. (Trans. 176). 
Dr. Sanders t e s t i f i e d tha t a severe s t r a i n or twist could 
aggravate the weakness in the cervical spine. (Trans. 177). 
Appellant c i t e s two hosp i t a l i za t ions as proof that Mr. Price 
had a p re -ex i s t ing neurological or cervica l problem in 
support of his argument tha t something o ther than the 
incident of September 15, 1981 cause Mr. P r i c e ' s injury. 
The facts are as follows: 
In 1968 Mr. Price was admitted to Carbon Hospital for 
treatment of fracture of r i b s , l e f t chest and contusion of 
l e f t leg as per discharge summary and discharge record. 
(Addendum 2, Defendant Exhibit 24). There i s no evidence of 
any injury to neck, spine, arm or head. (Addendum 2, Defendant 
Exhibit 24). 
In 1977 Mr. Price was again hosp i t a l i zed . He was t r ea t ed 
for mult iple contusions, l ace ra t ion of scalp and broken l e f t 
arm. There was "no deformity" of back and no neurological 
problems noted. (Addendum 3, Defendant Exhibit 23). His 
r ight arm was not t r ea t ed , nor any injury noted, he was not 
t r ea ted for any injury to neck or back, although x-ray was 
taken of ce rv ica l , t ho ras ic and lumbar spine. (Addendum 4, 
Defendant Exhibit 23). 
Mr. Price was admitted into the hosp i t a l again in 
January 1981 for p ros ta te surgery. Condition of h i s back was 
noted as "no deformity" and neurological condition was noted 
(5) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as "ref lexes are normal." (Addendum 5, Defendant Exhibit 25) . 
This examination was only nine months p r i o r to the incident 
on Spetember 15. 
Other than Appel lant ' s repeated reference to injury 
to Mr. P r i c e ' s r i g h t arm there i s no evidence tha t h i s r igh t 
arm was injured, diagnosed as injured or t r ea t ed for injury 
p r io r to September 15, 1981. 
Dr. Demman, who was Mr. P r i c e ' s t r e a t i n g physician and 
who refer red Mr. Price to Dr. Guafin, Neurologist , died shor t ly 
before t r i a l . Dr. Demman was obviously not avai lable to 
t e s t i f y . Dr. Gaufin's repor ts were admitted in to evidence 
by s t i p u l a t i o n of Counsel. (Trans. 66). Mr. Price t e s t i f i e d 
tha t immediately a f te r the inc ident with the mule he was sore 
through the shoulders and neck (Trans. 55) and the next day 
he could t e l l he was hur t ing , ge t t ing sore and feel ing dizzy. 
(Trans. 56). He t e s t i f i e d tha t two or three days l a t e r he 
aaw Dr. Sanders because h is hip was hur t ing rea l bad, h i s 
neck was hur t ing , h i s chin was numb and h i s hand was numb. Dr. 
Sanders re fe r red Mr. Price to Dr. Demman, who refer red him to 
Dr. Gaufin. 
On November 11 , 1984 U.P.& L. requested a jury t r i a l in 
the case on appeal herein (Addendum 6) . Bias was ainticipated 
by U.P.& L. as evidenced by t h e i r questions on vo i r d i r e . 
(Trans. 31, 32, 42) . There was no motion for change of 
venue made by U.P.& L. From a panel of 38 (Tr ia l Record), 
" ( 6 ) ' : " • " - • ' • 
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a jury was selected from the first twenty names called. 
OTrial Record p. 124). Four employees or spouses of 
employees of U.P.& L. were excused by the court prior to 
the initial call for fourteen jurors. (Trans. 5, 6). 
Juror Wilson was excused by the court because he felt 
his experiences with U.P.& L. through Emery Mining would 
possibly bias his decision. (Trans. 33). His excuse was 
a result of voir dire question proposed by counsel for 
Appellant. (Trans. 32). 
Juror Jensen was excused because she felt she would be 
biased in favor of a farmer. (Trans. 32). 
Juror Leamaster was excused by the court because her 
brother was involved in litigation against U.P,& L, (Trans. 20, 
21). 
Juror Lake was excused by the court because his association 
with Mr. Price could possible influence him, (Trans. 17). 
Juror Gregersen was excused by the court because he 
was a neighbor of Mr. Price. (Trans. 36 37). 
Juror Cox was excused by the court because she knew Mr. 
Price had been an employee of U.P.& L. at the time of 
incident and had heard about the case. (Trans. 37). 
Jurors were called from the panel to replace the six 
excused for cause as they were excused. County for U.P.& L. 
challenged no juror for cause. Coimsel for U.P.& L. did not 
object to the Court's denial of his request to ask if 
(7) 
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connection between U.P.& L. and Emery Mining layoffs would 
affect the jurors impartiality. (Trans. 42). Counsel for 
U.P.& L. at no time objected to the panel's size nor 
construction. Counsel for U.P.& L. passed the jury for cause 
(Trans. 43). The final panel of fourteen was constituted as 
follows: 
1. Hannert - An employee laid off from Emery Mining. 
(Trans. 10). 
2. Burnside - Husband laid off IPP. (Trans. 11). 
3. Nelson - Employee of Emery County Road Department, 
(Trans. 11, Defendant prempt #2, Addendum 7). 
4. Justesen - An employee of Emery Mining. (Trans. 12). 
5. Humphry - Employee of Emery County Road Department. 
(Plaintiff's prempt #1, Addendum 7). 
6. Adams - Coal miner at Plateau Mine. (Trans. 12).. 
7. Shorts - Hardware store owner. (Trans. 12). 
8. Spigarelli - School teacher, husband disabled Emery 
Mining. (Trans. 13). Counsel for U.P.& L. directed 
voir dire to her regarding bias. (Trans. 42, Plaintiff prempt 
#2, Addendum 7). 
9. Staley - Employed Emery Mining. (Trans. 13). 
10. Fuller - Employee of Nelson Construction. (Trans. 13, 
Plaintiff prempt #3, Addendum 7). 
11. Allred - Employee of Emery Mining. (Trans. 18). 
12. Rasmussen - Retired pipe fitter. (Trans. 21). 
(8) 
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13. Ekker - Employed Green River Medical Center; 
husband, self-employed. (Trans. 37, 38). 
14. Hayward - Laid off Emery Mining. (Trans. 38, 
Defendant prempt #1, Addendum 7). 
Of the eight jurors selected, the only jurors connected 
with U.P.& L. or Emery Mining were three jurors who were 
presently actively employed by Emery Mining Company. 
At the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendant moved for 
a directed verdict on the sole ground of insufficiency of 
the evidence with respect to negligence. (Trans. 110). Said 
Motion was denied. (Trans. 112). 
On January 21, 1985, U.P.& L. filed Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or, alternatively, Motion for 
New Trial. (Trial Record p. 176-177). The issue of 
insufficiency of evidence of causation was raised for the 
first time in Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
The issue of insufficiency of evidence and jury bias were 
raised for the first time as issues in Motion for New Trial. 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities in support of said 
motions was filed by U.P.& L. (Trial Record p. 180-215). 
Plaintiff's objection and supporting Memorandum was filed 
January 30, 1985 (Trial Record p. 219-238). Argument was 
heard by the court on February 13, 1985 (Trial Record p. 239) 
and the court took the matter under advisement; entering its 
findings in Memorandum Decision entered February 28, 1985, 
(9) 
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( T r i a l Record p . 240-244, Addendum 8 ) . Sa id dec i s i on 
denied Motion for Judgment No twi ths t and ing Verd ic t and 
Motion for New T r i a l . This appeal fo l lowed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues raised by Appellant on appeal were not 
timely raised before the trial court, therefore, this court 
is precluded from hearing the appeal. 
There was, as the trial court found, sufficient evidence 
of causation to support the jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff. 
There was no error in the trial court's denial of 
Defendants request that voir dire include an additional 
query regarding prejudice against Defendant and, if there 
was error, it was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THIS COURT ON APPEAL IS PRECLUDED FROM HEARING 
ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A POST JUDGMENT MOTION. 
Appellant requested the jury, anticipated bias, made 
no motion for change of venue, did not object to the courts' 
denial of its request to voir dire the jury regarding bias, 
as a result of lay offs at Emery Mining, and challenged no 
individual juror for cause. It is obvious that any possible 
jury bias was known to Appellant upon conclusion of voir dire. 
(10) 
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Appellant passed the jury for cause. 
Appellant did not raise the issue of insufficiency of 
the evidence with regard to causation at any time during 
the trial. Appellants' Motion for Directed Verdict rested 
solely on the issue of negligence; the only issue of law 
reserved for later determination. (URCP 50, Addendum 9). 
It is obvious that the issue of insufficiency of evidence, 
if any, would have been apparent to Appellant at the close 
of Plaintiff's case. It was not raised. 
In post judgment proceedings, Appellant raised the issues 
of jury bias and sufficiency of the evidence regarding 
causation for the first time; in its Motion for New Trial. 
This court has held in Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
682 P2d 832 (Utah 1984): 
In order to preserve a contention 
of error on appeal, the party claiming 
error in admission of evidence must 
raise the objection to the trial 
court in clear and concise terms and in 
a timely fashion calculated to obtain 
a ruling thereon. Where there was no 
clear and definite objection on the 
basis of hearsay, that theory cannot now 
be raised on appeal. Squibb did raise 
a hearsay objection after judgment was 
entered in the case. However, issues 
raised for the first time in post-
judgment motions are raised too late 
to be review on appeal. Therefore, we 
are precluded from addressing this 
assertion of error on the merits, 
at 837, citing. 
Barson deals with timely objection to admissibility of 
T. U.R.E. 4; Cook Assocs". Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P2d 1161 
(1983). State v. Malmrose, Utah 649 P2d 56 (1982). 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P2d 1040 
(Utah 1983). " ~ ~ ~~ 
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evidence. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in a case like the case 
at bar wherein a Motion for New Trial on the grounds of 
insufficiency of the evidence was made after a jury verdict, 
finding that the issue in question involved a Constitutional 
right, (eminent domain) the court agreed to hear the matter, 
but said: 
It is the general law that: 
"... a question or objection may not 
be raised for the first time on a 
motion for new trial, and a party 
may not speculate on the verdict by 
failing to raise a matter as to which 
he has knowledge and then raise it for 
the first time on a motion for a new 
trial.11 66 C.J.S. New §13b, p.104. 
In our own state, we have the following 
pronouncement from our Supreme Court: 
"Parties may not sit by and allow error 
which is not fundamental, to be committed 
without protesting and asking the trial 
court to correct the error at the time, 
and then later, when the judgment goes 
against them, ask for a new trial on that 
ground.11 (Emphasis Added). Southern 
Arizona Freight Lines v. Jackson,^48 Ariz. 
590, 518, 63 P2d 193, 197 (1936).2 
In the case of Agranoff v. Morton, 340 P2d 811 (1959), 
a case involving failure to take exception to jury instruction, 
the Washington Court said: 
It is the duty of counsel for all 
parties to promptly call the court's 
attention to any error in the trial. 
Counsel may not secretly nurture an 
error, speculate upon a favorable 
verdict, and then, in the event it 
T. Deer Valley Industrial Park Dev. & L. Co. v. State, Ariz. 5, 
Ariz. App. 150, 424 P2d 192, (1967). ~~~~ ™ " ~ 
rm 
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is adverse, bring forth the error 
as a life preserver on a motion for 
a new trial. 
The supreme court of Pennsylvania 
recently held: 
"... The rule has been stated over 
and over again that a party may not 
remain silent and take his chance 
on a verdict and then, if it is 
adverse, complain of some inadequacy 
which could have been quite easily 
corrected. See Susser v. Wiley, 
1944, 350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616; Rastmus 
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1949, 164 Pa. 
Super. 635, 639, 640, 67 A.2d 660; 
Stadham Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 
1950, 167 Pa. Super. 268, 275, 74 A.2d 
511...,f Bodine v. Boyd, 383 Pa. 525 
119 A.2d 54, 276. 
This specific problem was dealt with 
in Weinrob v. Heintz, 346 111. App. 30, 
41, 104 N.E. 2d 534, 539, as follows: 
"...An objection to the submission of the 
issue of fact to the jury must be made 
before the case is given to the jury. 
After the case has been submitted to 
the jury and a verdict has been 
returned it is too late to make or 
for the court to rule on the objection. 
Such objection, made for the first time 
on a motion for a new trial, is of no 
avail. A party is not permitted to lie 
by and speculate on his chances for a 
verdict and then raise objections which 
should have been raised during the trial. 
Goldschmidt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
335 111. App. 461, 467, 82 N.E.2d 357." 
Respondent's counsel made no request for 
a direction on the issue of liability. 
Had such a request been seasonably made, 
it would have been granted without objection. 
Had it been denied, respondent would have 
been in a position to urge it upon a motion 
for a new trial and, if necessary, then upon 
appeal. But he may not remain silent when 
(13) 
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it is time to speak, and then urge 
it for the first time on a motion 
for a new trial. 
The issues raised on this appeal were or should have 
been apparent to Appellant at least by mid-trial. They were 
not raised in motion for directed verdict. Appellant chose 
to await the jury verdict, which did not weigh in his favor, 
before raising the issues by way of Motion for New Trial, the 
same issues now raised on appeal. 
Respondent raised the issue of untimeliness at hearing 
on February 13, 1983 on Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict and Motion for New Trial. (Trial Record). The 
issues raised by Appellant were untimely raised before the 
trial court and preclude consideration by this court. 
(14) 
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POINT II 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IT'S 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED ON GROUNDS 
OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION TO ESTABLISH 
A PRIMA FACIE CASE, 
This court repeatedly held that the trial court has 
extensive discretion when granting or denying a new trial on 
the grounds of sufficiency of the evidence. 
The established standard for appellate review provided: 
...This court cannot substitute 
its discretion for that of the 
trial court, and this court will 
not interfere with such rulings, 
unless the abuse of, or failure to 
exercise, discretion on the part 
of the trial judge is clearly shown. 
If, upon examination of the evidence 
as disclosed by the record, it is apparent 
that there is a substantial conflict 
of evidence as to material issues of 
fact in the case relative to which 
the insufficiency is alleged, this court 
must hold as a matter of law that no 
abuse of discretion is shown. 
... If the evidence, taken as a whole, 
, be reasonably susceptible of opposite 
conclusions as to the existence or 
nonexistence of an ultimate fact 
depending upon inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, or the weight to be given to 
the testimony of this or that witness, 
or set of witnesses, we must conclusively 
presume the fact to be such as will support 
the ruling which we are called upon to reviewj 
but if, after giving due consideration to 
the fact that the trial judge is better able to 
weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence be 
such nevertheless as to impel but one reasonable 
conclusion, and that as to a fact adverse 
to the ruling, it would be our duty as an (15) 
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appellate court to so declare, 
notwithstanding there might be 
some conflict in the evidence. 
[Citations Omitted].3 
This rule was further refined by this court in the 
case of Nelson v. Trujillo, 647 ?2d 730 (Utah 1982) as 
follows : 
Where the t r i a l court has denied the 
motion for a new t r i a l , i t s decision w i l l 
be sustained on appeal i f there was "!an 
evident iary bas i s for the j u r y ' s decision 
. . . " The t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of a 
motion for a new t r i a l w i l l be reversed 
only i f n t h e evidence to support the 
verdic t was completely lacking or was 
so s l i gh t and unconvincing as to make 
the verd ic t p l a in ly unreasonable and 
unjust. t f McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 569 P2d 
1125, 1127 (1977); Polles"chev Transamerican 
Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 " 
P2d 236 (1972J. 
The t r i a l court in i t s Memorandum Decision (Addendum 
8, p.3) c i t i n g Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Ut.2d 419, 
497 P2d 28 ( 1 9 _ ) , found: 
. . . [T ]he court fee ls tha t there was 
suf f ic ien t evidence presented from 
which reasonable minds could conclude 
tha t there i s a grea te r p robab i l i t y tha t 
the conduct r e l i e d upon was a proximate cause 
of P l a i n t i f f ' s r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s . 
When, a t t r i a l , there e x i s t s a jury question with regard 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 
497 P2d 236 (1972); See a l so , Egbert & Jaynes v . R. C. Tolman 
Const., 680 P2d 746 (Utah 1984); Schmidt v. Intermountain 
Health Care, I n c . , 635 P2d 99, (Utah 1981), c i t i n g , Smith v. 
Shreeve, Utah, 551 P2d 1261 (1976), Lee v. Howes, 548 P2d ~ 
619 (1976) ; Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P2d 530 (Utah 1984), 
c i t i ng Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P2d 710 (Utah 1982) and 
Lembach~. Cox 639 P2d 197 (Utah 1981) ; Smith y, Vivcich, 
8UAR5, (Utah 1985), c i t i n g Bundy v Century Equipment Company 
s l i p . o p . 18270, f i l ed November 2, 1984, McCloud v. Baum, $69 
P2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
Hfrt 
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to an ultimate fact in issue it is not error for the trial 
court to deny a Motion for a New Trial based on a claim of 
4 
insufficiency of the evidence. 
The trial court below found there was sufficient evidence 
to support the jury's verdict. 
In this case as in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 
409 P2d 121 (Utah 1965): 
The parties have had what they 
were entitled to: a full and fair 
opportunity to present their 
contentions and the evidence supporting 
them to the court and jury. When this 
has been done all presumptions are in 
favor of the validity of the verdict 
and judgment, at 125. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision outlined the 
evidence presented at trial which the court found supportive 
of that decision. (Addendum 8, p.3,4). 
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 
lay testimony is admissible if the layman's inferences or 
opinions are rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and are helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or to a determination of the fact in issue. (Addendum 
10). Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence provides that experts 
may testify but does not provide for any situation in which 
such testimony is mandatory. (Addendum 10). 
In Roods v. Roods, 645 P2d 640 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme court held that lay opinion regarding the human 
F. Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P2d 221 (Utah 1956). 
(17) 
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gestation period was proper even though expert testimony 
would be admissible with respect to the issue. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff also was in a position to 
observe and perceive his injuries; when and how they occurred. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that the accident on September 
15, 1981 caused his mule to bolt. Mr. Price testified that, 
attempting to turn the mule and thus stop him, he twisted 
his body and exerted a tremendous amount of force. He pulled 
on the reins with his left hand and pushed on the saddle 
with his right hand so forcefully that at the end of the 
ordeal the bit in the mule's mouth was bent. Plaintiff observed, 
and testified, that subsequent to this accident he experienced 
severe pain and numbness in his arm, his muscles shriveled and 
he lost the use of his right hand. None of these symptoms 
were apparent, diagnosed or treated prior to the accident. 
In A. E. Egede Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 9 3 Wash. 
2d 127, 606 P2d 1214 (1980), the Washington court found no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowing Plaintiff 
to testify concerning the causal relation between injuries 
suffered in an accident and back problems suffered during a 
subsequent pregnancy. It said: 
In direct examination, plaintiff was 
asked if, during pregnancy, she had 
problems resulting from the ski lift 
accident. Arguably, the challenged 
question called for a medical 
conclusion by a law witness. Plaintiff 
should not be foreclosed, however, from 
( i s ) • . ' ; • - ' ^ 
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comparing the pregnancy and birth 
of her first child, prior to the 
accident, with the pregnancy and 
birth of her second child, 
subsequent thereto. Under properly 
formulated questions, plaintiff is 
qualified to explain differences in 
pain or discomfort in the two births, 
at 1221. 
In this case, Mr. Price was likewise qualified to explain the 
differences in his condition before and after his injury. 
Appellant, in the case at bar, made no objection to 
Mr. Price's testimony. In the case of Barnett v. Richardson, 
415 P2d 987 (Okla. 1966) the court held that where an injury 
is patent, objective rather than subjective, the Plaintiff 
is competent to testify as to the injury, the treatment 
received therefore, and the reaction of such treatment and that 
the testimony is sufficient for the jury to render a verdict 
and that no expert medical testimony is necessary. The time 
of Mr. Price's injury, the onset of his pain and discomfort, 
his shriveled arm and the loss of use of that arm, were patent 
and objective indices of injury. 
In Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah2d 154, 449 P2d 996 (.1969), 
a personal injury action resulting from an automobile collision, 
the court held that the trial judge should be allowed 
reasonable latitude of discretion both as to the necessity for 
expert testimony and as to the qualification of the witness to 
give it. 
(19) 
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Plaintiffs' testimony and records of his medical 
history revealed that although Mr. Price was extensively 
examined by medical doctors there was no prior medical 
diagnosis of the type of injury from which he suffered 
after the incident of September 15, 1985. This evidence was 
sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the accident in 
question was the cause of the injuries Plaintiff suffered. 
It is proper to establish causation through 
circumstantial evidence. When a jury can draw correct 
inferences from the facts, expert opinion is not necessary. 
At trial Plaintiff introduced evidence from which a jury 
could find causation. Defendant, on the other hand, attempted 
to prove a pre-existing injury from which the jury could infer 
the absence of causation. 
The fact that the Defendants introduced the testimony of 
chiropractors regarding pre-existing injury and Plaintiff's 
evidence consisted of his own testimony augmented by 
documentary evidence does not require that the jury attribute 
more weight to the chiropractors' testimony. 
In Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P2d 591 (1982), the court held 
that: 
fN]o matter how arcane the subject 
matter or how erudite the witness, 
the jury is not required to accept 
the experts' testimony as conclusive. 
The jurors may give such testimony 
any weight they choose, including 
no weignt at all. p.597. 
IT Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, supra: at p. 
6. Paz v. Lorenzo SmitF & Son, Inc., 17 Utah2d 221, 408 P2d 
186 (1965). 
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The court in Hurler v. The Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz. 
App. 66, 474 P2d 73 (1970) held that if the medical opinion 
conflicts with the inescapable legal conclusion gleaned from 
the facts, the former must give way to the latter. Medical 
testimony is not, therefore, conclusive. Given this fact 
and given the fact that lay testimony is sufficient in the 
instant case to enable the jury to find causation, medical 
testimony is not required. 
Unless the doctor is a witness to an accident he must 
rely on his patient's statement of history to determine 
causation. Medical reports in evidence refer to Mr. Price's 
accident. (See Gaufin letter of May 10, 1982. (Plaintiff 
Exhibit 4, Addendum 11). 
No reports admitted indicated any question that the 
incident of September 15, 1981 resulted in the injury for 
which they treated Plaintiff. This letter was introduced 
into evidence, by stipulation. Defendant neither disputed 
nor rebutted it's contents. 
Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to warrant taking 
the issue of causation to the jury. The testimony of Doctors 
Thayn and Sanders support Plaintiffs' testimony and the medical 
evidence which was before the jury. The terms used by the 
doctors meets the standard established by this court; 
The general rule regarding the 
certainty of an expert's opinion 
is that of the expert may not 
give an opinion which represents 
(2D 
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a mere guess, speculation, or 
conjecture. See 2 Jones on Evidence, 
§14:29 (6th ed. 1972). Expert "~ 
medical opinion evidence based 
on a probability, possibility, 
or likelihood has been admitted, 
however, where the witnesses 
expressed statements in language 
which sufficiently represented their 
own best judgment to a reasonable 
certainty. Jones on Evidence, 
supra, at 663-64, explains the 
distinction as follows: 
Although there are limits as to 
how uncertain an expert may be 
in his opinions there is still the 
question of how certain he may show 
himself to be with respect to them 
... [T]he witness may use such 
language as expresses his actual 
state of mind on the matter, whether 
it be in terms of possibility, 
probability, or actuality. This is 
commonly described as testimony that 
a result might, could, or would follow 
from a given state of facts. [Citations 
Omitted].7 
It is important to note the case of Rowe v. Maule Drug 
Company, 196 Kansas 489, 413 P2d 104 (1966) a case wherein 
the court held that the medical testimony objected to as 
mere possibility, was an honest expression of professional 
opinion of causal connection and also held that medical 
testimony of possibility plus lay testimony together are 
sufficient to establish a causal connection. 
The case of Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F2d 808 
(10th Cir. 1981), cited by Defendants, is distinguishable in 
that it is a products liability case and therefore espouses a 
narrow rule of law within the confines of the crashworthiness 
doctrine. Whether or not this particular roof caused more 
T. State v. Jarrell, 60lTP2d 218, (Utah 1980). 
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injuries to Plaintiff than he would have otherwise suffered 
in a roll over accident is a question that centers on the 
kind and quality of roof - a subject about which jurors can 
only speculate. They cannot compare Plaintiff's injuries in 
this case with Plaintiffs' injuries in a roll over accident 
involving the crashworthiness of a vehicle roof. In the 
instant case, however, the jurors can compare Plaintiffs1 
injuries before and after the accident and logically infer 
causation. There was sufficient evidence introduced to take 
the case to the jury. The jury could infer from the evidence 
before it that the accident from which the case arises and 
Plaintiffs1 injuries were causally related. Although, the 
evidence on issue of fact was disputed and reasonable people 
might arrive at different conclusions. The issue was decided by 
8 
the jury. Their decision should not be disturbed on appeal. 
The trier of fact was thoroughly instructed, at Defendants 
request, on the issue of causation. (Instruction 18, 19, 25; 
Addendum 12, 13, 14). 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. 
9 
Price, the established standard for appellate review, this 
Court should sustain the decision of the trial court and 
deny appellants request, on appeal, for a new trial. 
• / • • • ! . . . ' • ' 
8~. Smith v. Vivcich, 8UAR 5, 1985. 
9- Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P2d 693 (Utah 1982). 
10. McCloud v Baum, 569 P2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Egbert & Jaynes 
v. R. C. Tolman7 supra; n.3, citing Charlton V. Hackett, IT 
Utah 2d 389 360 P2d 176 (1961) and URCP 59(a)(6), Addendum 
15,p.l).
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POINT III 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED 
ON DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO FURTHER VOIR DIRE THE JURY . 
WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE PREJUDICE. 
Appellants claim of error and request on appeal that this 
court order a new trial is apparently grounded upon the size of 
the verdict which the jury returned in favor Respondent. 
URCP59(a)(5), (Addendum 15, p .1) . ,,. .-
The recent case of Bennion v. Legrand Johnson Construction, 
11 UARP 33 (Utah 19 85) involved a claim on appeal that damages 
awarded were excessive and appeared to have been given under 
passion or prejudice. This court outlined applicable Utah law: 
Obviously a jury must have some 
latitude in the exercise of its 
judgment in awarding damages. 
It has been stated that "juries are 
generally allowed wide discretion 
in the assessment of damages." A 
reviewing court will defer to a 
jury's damage award -unless the 
award indicates that the jury 
disregarded competent evidence, or 
that the award is so excessive beyond 
rational justification as to indicate 
the effect of improper factors in the 
determination, or that "it clearly 
appears that the award was rendered 
under [a] misunderstnading." To 
justify a new trial for excessive 
damages under Rule 59(a)(5), Utah R. 
Civ. P., the damage award must be more 
than generous; it must be clearly 
excessive on any rational view of the 
evidence. at 36. [Citations Omitted]. 
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The jury in this case was instructed thoroughly and 
correctly in the applicable law of damages. All instructions 
given on the damage issue were given at the request of 
Defendants. They were told that general damages could be 
awarded to Plaintiff which would fairly and adequately 
compensate him for mental and physical harm, its duration and 
severity, the extent he prevented from pursuing his normal 
affairs of life, loss of earning capacity and future damage of 
the same kind. (Instructions 20, 22, 23, 24, Addenda 16, 17, 
18, 19). Instructions 26, 27, 28, 29, and 32, (Addenda 20, 
21, 22, 23, and 24) cautions the jury with regard to limitations 
on their calculation of said damage. 
As in Bennion the trial court in the case presently 
before this court found that there was adequate evidence of 
aggravation of Mr. Price's physical condition and loss of income 
to justify the damage award. (Addendum 8, p.2). 
In the absence of any proof on the record of actual 
juror bias,11 Appellant argues the possibility of juror bias 
allegedly transferring itself to Defendant, U.P.& L., as a result 
of lay offs at Emery Mining Company. 
Several cases cited by Appellant to support its argument 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its voir 
dire of the jury require distinction. 
In the case of Anderson v. Montgomery, 607 P2d 838,(Utah 
1980), this court found that discovery after trial, of an 
TT Hanson v. General Builders Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 
389 P2d 61 (1964). 
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attorney client relationship between Defendant's counsel 
and juror did not materially affect Plaintiffs right to an 
impartial jury and did not: constitute prejudicial error. 
In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P2d 533 (Utah 1981) the case 
was reversed and remanded on three grounds; one of which 
was a statement by a juror on voir dire that she might 
be biased in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff's Motion for 
removal of this juror for cause had been denied. 
State v. Ball, 685 P2d 1055 (Utah 1983), was a criminal 
case (driving under the influence of alcohol) which was 
vacated and remanded when the court would not further voir dire 
four witnesses whose answers indicated a possible bias against 
the use of alcohol which was a material issue in the case. 
The trial court in this case excused on it's own Motion 
all those who indicated the slightest possibility of bias. 
The trial judge has broad discretion in the manner in 
12 
which voir dire is accomplished. In this case the trial 
judge conducted extensive voir dire, excusing jurors on the 
court's motion for hints of bias that have, which in other cases 
have been found to fall outside the scope of the applicable rule. 
URCP 47(f). (Addendum 25). The trial court felt and stated 
on the record that the question proposed by Appellant had been 
adequately dealt with in another question (Trans. 42) in which 
the Court asked: 
TT. Utah State Road v. "Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 238, 444 P2d 57 
(1968), State v. Dixon, 560 P2d 318 (Utah 1977), State v. 
Lacy, 665 Pzd 1311 (Utah 1983), Maltby v. Cox Const. Co., 
Inc., 598 P2d 336 (Utah 1979). 
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...Have any of you had any 
experiences whatsoever that 
might make you not consider the 
said advocated by Utah Power & 
Light or give it less weight or 
more weight because of some 
dealings you might have had, other 
than an open dispute...[Trans. 33, 
Emphasis Added]. 
The jury was thoroughly instructed by the court 
regarding impartiality. (Instructions 3, 9, 12, 23, 25, 29, 
Addendum 26, 27, 28, 18, 14, 23). 
There is no basis to Appellant's claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion. The decision rendered below 
13 
should be upheld on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment on verdict of the jury should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SL 
MA&LYNN BENNETT LEMA 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, 
VICTOR PRICE 
TT. Maltby, supra at N.12. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PRICE, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
v s 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
A Utah C o r p o r a t i o n , and 
DAVID ZSERAI, 
D e f e n d a n t s - A p p e l l a n t s . 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH IN ANDfOR EMERY CO. 
MOV 28 1984 
By. 
BRUCE C. FUNK, Clerk 
^ / • S C f l U Deoutv 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PRICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and 
DAVID ZSERAI, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 4210 
We, the jury, return our verdict in this case by answering 
the following questions, in accordance with the instructions of 
Judge Bunnell: . 
1. Were defendants David Zseirai and Utah Power & Light 
Company negligent in the operation of heavy equipment in Emery 
County on 15 September 1981? 
Yes 0 1 2 3 4 5 (6? 7 8 
No 0 l ( 2 ) 3 . 4 5 6 7 8 ' 
2. If "yes" (by 6 or more jurors), was such negligence of 
David Zserai and Utah Power & Light Company a proximate cause of 
the damages"sustained by Victor Price? 
Yes 0 1 2 3. ' 4 5 (?) 7 8 
No 0 1 (2) 3 *4 5 6 7 8 
ffjJlMM^ l 
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3. Was plaintiff Victor Price negligent in failing to 
properly care for his own safety while riding his mule on 
15 September 1981? 
Yes 0 1 2 3 4 5 (6) 7 8 
No 0 1 (2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. If "yes" (by 6 or more jurors) , was such negligence of 
Victor Price a proximate cause of the damages sustained by him? 
Yes 0 1 2 3 4 5 , ^ 0 8 
No 0 Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. This question is answered only if we have found above 
that both the defendants and the plaintiff were negligent in a 
way that proximately caused damages to the plaintiff. In other 
words, at least 6 of us have answered "yes" to each of the 4 
questions above. Otherwise, we do not answer this question. 
We now consider the negligence of the defendants and the 
plaintiff to total 100%. We allocate the 100% negligence between 
the defendants, on the one hand, and the plaintiff, on the other 
hand, by weighing the negligence of the defendants against that 
of the plaintiff and determining relative negligence. Our answer 
in percentages reflects our decision. 
What part of the 100% negligence is attributable to: 
Defendants David Zserai and 
Utah Power & Light Company* V<? % 
Plaintiff Victor Price 
TOTAL 
fo 
100 
% 
% 
&. c 2. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
6. Considering only the instructions and evidence concerning damages, 
and without being concerned with fault or negligence in answering this 
question, what amount of money would fairly and adequately compenstate 
plaintiff, Victor Price, for any and all damages sustained as a result of the 
accident on 15 September 1981? 
Special damage $ Q?5S<3 
General damage $ /<5^, 0 0° 
Total $ f£~Q3 5 O 
_ * j — ^ 
Jury Forman 
DATED: £jf November, 1984 
^r-
*3 
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NAME P r i c e , Mr. V ic tor 
ADMITTANCE RECORD 
PaC. N a t ' l JHf^TAI. NUMBER 
CODE I n s . SS.NO. LOCAL 
44 szr-r? 
K-66U 
ADDRESS C a s t l e D a l e , Utah 
BIRTH DATE £ ^ 
2 - 1 5 - 1 2 ( 
ADM. DATE 
3 - 1 7 - 6 8 
1' 
DIS. DATE 
fa*- c*t 
SEX 
M 
TIME 
6:30 ?v 
TIME 
PHONE 7 ^ 8 - 2 ^ 3 PHYSICIAN A.R.Demman 
RACE 
. w 
S.M.W.D. 
N 
RELIGION 
LDS 
ROOM 
E 
P T S . EMPLOYER 1 
| s e l f 
NEAREST RELATIVE OR FRIEND 
Mrs, A l i c e P r i c e 
OCCUPATION 
rancher 
1 RELATION 
wf 
ADDRESS OF RELATIVE OR FRIEND 
c • 
same 
Admission Diagnosis 
Final Diagnosis 
SUMMARY AND DISCHARGE RECORD 
* J L 
lUo^t^-^ A jOj-, JUtal^X' 
' ft" r^Z^l^T^TZTT^j^T^ a^jxz^^j^ ci A<V { 
0. tf 
Complications . 
&S\ 
Treatment Rendered 
Surgery, including manipulation and/or reduction (specify). 
%£.w3^»k .£&:! 
INDEX CODE 
V2£JL 
L^k^L. 
Q Antibacterial (specify) 
Supportive Only 
D Other 
Blood Transfusions p&fttl Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V 
DISCHARGE SUMMARY 
ZE, VICTOR 
65,.MALE, WHITE 
ADMISSION: 9/ 6/77 
DISCHARGE: 9/15/77 
This 65 year old male was admitted on 9/6/77 and released on 9/15/77 following an 
try when a horse bucked and ran right over him producing multiple injuries with a. 
rture of the right ulna and with a fracture of the left ulna and radius and also 
>ration of the scalp and multiple injuries. 
ICAL EXAMINATION: Temp: 99 Pulse: 80 Resp: 21 B.P.: 140/80 
RAL: 
T: 
V: 
>: 
AVASCULAR: 
WITIES: 
\ATICS: 
^LOGICAL: 
TAL COURSE: 
ATORY: 
St 
\SIS: 
&d 
EMMAN, M.D. 
A well nourished, slight obese male admitted to the hospital 
following an accident when the horse went over him. 
Normal in appearance. No excoriations or dermatosis is present. 
Round and symmetrical. The eardrums are intact. He has a 
laceration of the scalp. Pupils are round and equal and react 
to light and accommodation. There is no nasal obstruction. 
Throat is normal in appearance. 
Equal expansion on both sides. Both sides symmetrical. He has 
marked pain due to breathing on the left side. Possible some 
fractured ribs. 
No fluid, no rales, no consolidation. 
Normal sinus rhythm. No murmurs, no thrills, no arrhytmias. 
No deformity. 
He has a great deal of swelling and deformity of the left wrist. 
He has multiple contusions and also laceration of the scalp. 
No enlargement of the axillary or cervical lymph glands. 
All physiological reflexes are present. 
Uninventful. Reduction of the fracture was done. 
Urine, within normal limits with the exception of 4,5, to 7 white 
blood cells per high powered field. The WBC was 17,500. The 
hemoglobin 14.8 grs., hematocrit was 46%. Stabs. 13, Segs. 68, 
Lymphs. 16, Monos. 2. 
iLeft wrist shows comminuted fracture of the distal radius with 
extension into the articular surface where there is a fracture 
of the ulnar styloid process at the base. 
Skull fracture, none present. Had^a large lac^i^f-inn nn th*. 
frontal area .and a possible fracture of ribs on the left side. 
The reduction was done and views of the left wrist shows the 
fracture of the distal radius. The cast has been applied and 
shows a fracture relationship satisfactorily. Ulnar styloid 
fractures also noted. Cast was applied and after reduction, 
under general anesthesia. ....*.-. 
The patient will see me again in the future and the diagnosis 
was a fracture of the left wrist, piultiple contusions and 
laceration of the scalp. 
t&dtofiitiwj 
fat/ 
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY HOSPITAL #10520 
PRICE, VICTOR ADMISSION: 1/7/81 
AGE 68, MALE, WHITE - DISCHARGE: 1/25/81 
This 69 year old male was admitted to the hospital on 1/7/81 and released 
on 1/25/81. 
GENERAL: 68 year old male, slight obese. 
HEENT: Head is round and symmetrical. Ear drums are intact. 
Pupils are round and equal, react to light and accomodation. 
No nasal obstruction. Throat is normal in appearance. 
CHEST: Equal expansion on both sides. Both sides symmetrical. 
LUNGS: No fluid, no rales, no consolidation. 
CARDIOVASCULAR: Normal sinus rhythm. No murmurs, no thrills, no arrhythmias. 
ABDOMEN: No masses, no tenderness, no rigidity. 
BACK: No deformity. 
EXTREMITIES: No varicosities. No dermatosis. No excoriations. 
GENITALIA: Normal externally. 
RECTAL: No internal, external hemorrhoids are present. 
NEUROLOGICAL: Reflexes are normal. 
He was referred to Dr. Wally Snihurowych for T.U.R. He had a T.U.R. 
done in 1973 and at the present time he had an obstruction which was taken care 
of by a T.U.R. by Dr. Snihurowych. The course in the hospital was uneventful 
and the discharge condition was good. 
DIAGNOSIS: 1) Right hydrocele which was repaired. 
2) T.U.R. which was done by Dr. H.M. Snihurowych, 
3) Benign hypertrophy of the prostate. 
He will report to my office and also.to Dr. Snihurowych when the time 
is designated for further instruction. 
A.R. OEMMAN, M.D. 
ARD/jj 
1/25/81 
1/26/81 
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Robert Gordon 
David A. Westerby for 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 535-4265 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Power & Light Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PRICE, ) 
. ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) _ REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 4210 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation, and ) 
DAVID ZSERAI, ) ':'• 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Defendants Utah Power & Light Company and David Zserai 
hereby request a trial by jury on all factual issues in this 
case. 
The required fee of $50.00 is enclosed herewith. 
PuauJes^ iJavid A. Westerby 
» • 
Date: /( bk>«£jr\l>Qj~ »9S^ 
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MOV 23 1984 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH BRUCE C. FUNK, Clerk 
py " < | ^ n tT . Deoutv 
VICTOR PRICE, 
P l a i n t i f f , J U R Y L I S T 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and 
DAVID ZERAI, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 4210 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PRICE, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ' NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
) VERDICT OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION 
* FOR NEW TRIAL 
) 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, ) 
a Utah Corporation, and 
DAVID ZSERAI, ) 
* ) 
Defendants. Civil No. 4210 
The defendants have filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The plaintiff has 
filed their objection to the motion and both-parties have submitted their 
memorandums of points and authorities and the Court heard oral arguments 
on the motion and rules thereon as hereinafter stated. 
The defendants base their motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on the following grounds: 
1. The evidence was insufficient to establish a duty of care 
running from the defendants to the plaintiffs; 
2. There was no evidence of causation in fact between the 
incident and the damages complained of. 
They base their Motion for a new trial, in the alternative, on the 
same grounds stated above and on the'further ground that the Court failed to 
ask prospective jurors as to the affect of lay-offs within their families 
that might have a bearing on their impartiality and, further, that damages 
were excessive. , Mtttrt^"" 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In considering the Motion, the Court must look at the evidence 
in its best possible light to see that a prima facie case has been 
presented and if there was sufficient believable facts presented so 
that reasonable jurors could reach the conclusion found by the jury. 
The Court cannot find any prejudice for failure to ask the 
prospective jurors a question relative to lay-offs within their families. 
The jurors were adequately and thoroughly questioned about any prejudice 
against the defendant, Utah Power and Light Comoany, to insure impartiality 
in this regard and, therefore, the Court denies the Motion based upon this 
ground. 
The jurors obviously believed the plaintiff's testimony that the 
defendant, Zserai, summoned and beckoned the plaintiff to come to his 
machine on his mule where the defendant Zserai was seeking directions and 
information from the plaintiff. When the plaintiff came to within three 
or four feet of the machine on his mule, a clear duty was present on the 
part of the defendant Zserai to operate the machine so 3s not to startle 
the animal on which the plaintiff was seated/ The Court also denies the 
Motion based upon this ground. 
The Court will not disturb the amount of damages as found by the 
jury since there was adequate evidence by way of aggravation of his existing 
physical condition that resulted in a shriveled right arm and loss of income 
to justify the jury's ultimate finding in this regard. * * 
* 
-Page Two- - rtyf^^ 
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The question-of causation has given the Court some problem 
because of the lack of direct expert testimony in this regard. 
In Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 497 P2d 28, 27 Ut2d 419, the 
Court stated: 
"Jurors may not speculate as to probabilities; 
they may, however, make justifiable inferences 
from circumstantial evidence to find negligence 
or proximate cause. In such instances, circumstancial 
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of negligence, if men of reasonable minds 
may conclude that there is a greater probability 
that the conduct relied upon was the proximate 
cause of the injury than there is that it was not." 
In reviewing the evidence presented in this case, the Court feels 
that there was sufficient evidence presented from which reasonable minds 
could conclude that there is a greater probability that the conduct relied 
upon was a proximate cause of plaintiff's resulting injuries. 
Although the plaintiff had a prior condition in his back and limbs 
that precipitated treatment by a chiropractor, there was testimony presented 
by the plaintiff that he experienced extreme pain ^ in his hip, neck and 
shoulders, immediately after the incident that he had not experienced before. 
That the day following the incident, he had difficulty walking and felt 
dizziness, and there was further testimony that his friends noticed a marked 
change in his physical activities and appearance immediately after the accident. 
There was further testimony that the plaintiff went to Dr. Sanders, 
a Chiropractor, who had treated the plaintiff in the past, the day after the 
accident, and told him of the incident and that he was feeling numbness in 
his limbs and had pain and discomfort in his back and hips. There was further 
testimony that Dr. Sanders attempted treatment without result, and then 
/fMbrtjte*"* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
referred the plaintiff to Dr. Demman, a physician, and that at that time, 
the plaintiff complained of head, hip and neck pain, and numbness of 
his limbs. 
The plaintiff further testified that right after the accident 
his hand became useless, that his right arm began to shrivel and, because 
of these results, Dr. Demman commenced a series of therapy treatments at 
the hospital, without any noticeable result-
Then, in the early part of February, 1982, Dr. Demman referred 
the plaintiff to the neurologist who performed surgery on his vertebrae 
in February of 1982, at a time when he was complaining of the same symptoms, 
only greatly aggravated, that were present right after the accident occurred. 
The surgery improved his condition as far as relieving the pain and numbness, 
and he generally felt better. 
Dr. GaufiVs report, introduced into evidence, states: "Post 
i 
operatively the patient has done well with numbness in the fourth and fifth 
fingers of his right hand improved to almost normal. The aching that he had 
in his elbow was no longer present, patient's pain in his npck was significantly 
improved at the time of discharge from the hospital." 
The Doctors further reports indicate that after the operation, 
the syniptons present for the first time right after the accident were eliminated 
or improved substantially by the surgery. | 
In Dr. Gaufin's letter to Dr. Demman, dated May. 10, 1982, he states 
as follows: "His right arm and hand strength' is still weaker than it was 
before his accident, but it is significantly better than before his suraerv." 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
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Based upon this Finding, the Court denies the Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, a 
Motion for New Trial. 
<f ( 
DATED this ,_..Xv day of February, 1985. 
•-> 
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGF* 
v* 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing, MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the.following: 
David A. Westerby 
Robert Gordon 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Marlynn B. Lema 
Attorney at Law 
108 North 4th West 
Post Office Box 1026 
Price, Utah '•• 84501 
DATED this Z3t/ day of February, 1985. 
Secretary 
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Rule 50 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 50 
rogatory. Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to request special interrogatory 
waives issue of fact. If a party fails to request 
that a fact issue be submitted to the jury on 
special interrogatory, he waives his right to 
trial by jury on that issue, and the court may 
make a finding consistent with the jury verdict. 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
Entering judgment on special 
interrogatories discretionary with trial 
court. The matter of entering judgment in 
accordance with the answers to special 
interrogatories is within the discretion of the 
trial judge. Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 
(1960). 
Rule 50. Motion for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict; When Made; Effect A party who moves for 
a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. 
A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without 
any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Whenever a motion 
for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a 
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered 
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion 
for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten 
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance 
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined 
with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict 
was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the 
judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the 
requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may 
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or 
may order a new trial. 
(c) Same; Conditional Rulings on Grant of-Mot ion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for 
in subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the 
motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted 
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the 
grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion 
for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not 
affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the 
new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. 
86 
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Rule 50 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 50 
In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the 
respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment 
is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with 
the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of Motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, 
assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court 
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether 
a new trial shall be granted. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Motion for Directed Verdict. r 
III. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Cited in Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 
376 P.2d 541 (1962); Hyland v. St. Mark's 
Hosp., 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967); 
Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566 (1967); Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 
427 (Utah 1982). 
II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
Court to view evidence in l ight most 
favorable to nonmovant Upon a motion for a 
directed verdict, the trial court is obliged to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom it is directed. Anderson 
f. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). 
Error in judge's weighing evidence not 
reversible where decision correc t Although 
in passing on a motion for directed verdict it is 
not proper for the trial court judge to weigh 
evidence, that he does so in a case does not 
result in prejudicial error where the party is not 
entitled to succeed in any event. Cerritos 
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 
608 (Utah 1982). 
Appellate court to v iew evidence in light 
most favorable to nonmovant. Upon review 
of a directed verdict, the court must examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
kwing party, and if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence and in the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom that would support a judg-
ment in favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot be sustained. Management 
Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n 
ex rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
And sustain grant of motion only if no 
different conclusion possible. The Supreme 
Court will sustain the granting of a motion for 
a directed verdict only if the evidence was such 
that reasonable men could not arrive at a differ-
ent conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 
68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). 
A directed verdict pursuant to subdivision 
(a), upon the ground that the evidence fails to 
show that defendant is negligent, is 
tantamount to granting a motion for a nonsuit, 
and on appeal must be reversed if the evidence 
is such that reasonable men could arrive at a 
different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 
Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
* NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
The trial court can enter a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict for only one 
reason — the absence of any substantial evi-
dence to support the verdict. Koer v. Mayfair 
Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). 
Rules for deciding motion for directed 
verdict applicable. In passing on a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the 
court is governed by the same rules as it is when 
passing upon a motion for a directed verdict. 
Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566 (\967). . . 
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Rule 615 
% Extrinsic 
nibble unless 
sane and the 
benon, or the 
j-t-»t apply to 
e gt ftement to the 
r tjh< substance of 
ictose (1971). The 
v-£i> formerly in 
^ci^ee (1971). 
& ny Court, 
the suggestion 
* examine wit-
ipss.es, whether 
iU? or to inter-
i>!« opportunity 
n^d so that they 
g t; e order of its 
ur-rty who is a 
it, not a natural 
a person whose 
;^n of his cause. 
Rule 701 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 702 
ARTICLE VII. 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Rule 70L Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
COMMITTEE NOTE 
period. The admission of a mother's testimony 
on the subject of gestation period of her preg-
nancy is not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
This Rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is 
substantially the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971) contained similar language. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Mother may testify as to her gestation 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
COMMITTEE NOTE 
This Rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was sub-
stantially the same. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Question as to whether witness qualifies 
as expert is forjudge. The trial judge has the 
primary responsibility for determining 
whether a particular witness qualifies as an 
expert. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1980). 
Qualification. The matter of qualification of 
in expert witness lies in the discretion of the 
court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984). 
Facts or data used by a properly 
qualified expert in forming an opinion need 
sot be in evidence if they are of a type reason-
ably relied on by experts in the witness's field 
of expertise. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Trial court did not err in allowing an expert's 
testimony relating to drug experience reports 
not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Opinion of expert witness based on evi-
dence presented at trial. Expert's testimony 
was properly excluded where witness was 
unable to give his opinion based upon data 
made known to him at trial, as, absent personal 
knowledge of the facts, this was the only ground 
on which the evidence could have come in. 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
t^ttfdtw 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the cause that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury. For one person's negligence to be a proximate cause of 
an injury, that negligence must be a substantial or material 
factor in bringing about the injury. 
-~v 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
A plaintiff, such as Victor Price, may also be negligent 
with respect to his own injuries. Such negligence of a plaintiff 
may cooperate with the negligence of another in proximately 
causing his own injury. If you determine that David Zserai and 
Utah Power & Light Company were negligent and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, you 
will also be asked to determine whether Victor Price was also 
negligent in bringing about his own injuries. 
/^e*&6^ 13 
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INSTRUCTION NO. tyj 
You are not to award damages for any injury or condition 
from which the plaintiff may have suffered, or may now be 
suffering, unless it has been established by a preponderance of 
the evidence in the case that such injury or condition was 
proximately caused by the accident in question, not by a 
condition or accident that occurred before. If you find that 
Victor Price suffers or did suffer from some abnormal condition 
that has not been proximately caused by Utah Power or David 
Zserai, even though it may invite your sympathy, you may not 
assess any damages against Utah Power or David Zserai for that 
condition. However, if negligence of Utah Power or David Zserai 
has been a proximate cause of aggravating such a condition, that 
should be considered in fixing damages. 
151 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, 
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution 
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall 
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the 
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing Transcript of Satisfaction in Other Counties. When any 
satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of 
the county in which such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of 
satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment may 
have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall 
be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect 
as in the county where the same was originally entered. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Cited in Utah C.V. Fed. Credit Union v. 
Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1974). 
Rule 59. New Trials; Amendments of Judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the appli-
cation, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a newT trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
I General Consideration. 
II. Grounds. 
A In General. 
8. Misconduct of Jury. 
C. Accident or Surprise. , • 
D. Newly Discovered Evidence. 
E. Excessive or Inadequate Damages. 
F. Insufficiency of Evidence. 
G. Decision Against Law. 
II! Time for Motion. 
IV Affidavits. 
V On Initiative of Court. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
The Supreme Court cannot consider a 
motion for a new trial since that is a matter 
Hdressed to the trial court. Jennings v. Stoker, 
#2 P2d 912 (Utah 1982). 
A motion for a new trial is not properly 
iddressed nor may it be filed with the Supreme 
Court. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 
P2d 430 (1970). 
An order granting a new trial is not a 
final judgment; it only sets aside the verdict 
iH places the parties in the same position as if 
^•re had been no previous trial. Haslam v. 
Fiulwn, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Remedies for questioning grant of a new 
triil. If a trial court's authority with respect to 
• w>tion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily, 
t** proper redress is either in a petition for 
~>riocutory appeal, which may be granted in 
i proper case, or in the preservation of error for 
*vfw, if necessary, upon the final outcome of 
** case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 
V* P.2d 736 (1964). 
A timely motion under this Rule termi-
•atet the running of the time for appeal of 
a judgment, and time for appeal does not begin 
to run again until the order granting or denying 
such a motion is entered. Hume v. Small Claims 
Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979). 
Standard for review. When a new trial is 
granted based on the weight of the evidence, the 
standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling is 
much narrower than the trial court's standard 
in granting the new trial. Goddard v. Hickman, 
685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). 
A trial court has a wide latitude of discre-
tion with respect to a motion for a new trial, 
in conformity with the general supervisory 
powers which it necessarily has over the 
verdicts of juries in the interest of the adminis-
tration of justice. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 
2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
The broad discretionary power of the trial 
court in the granting or denying of new trials is 
well established. This discretion is necessary to 
allow the court an opportunity to cause 
reexamination or correction of jury verdicts or 
findings which it believes to be in error, or 
where there is substantial doubt that the issues 
were fairly tried. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. % 
Without being concerned about fault or negligence, it will be your 
duty to determine the plaintiff's damages, if any, as you may find from a 
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate him for any 
injury and damage he has sustained as a proximate result of the accident. 
^ f e ^ W / ^ 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
. r 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the nature and 
extent of the injuries sustained by him; the degree and character 
of his suffering, both mental and physical, its probable duration 
and severity, and the extent to which he has been presented from 
pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as enjoyed by him before 
the accident; and any disability or loss of earning capacity 
resulting from such injury. 
You may also consider whether any of the above will, with 
reasonable certainty, continue in the future, and if you so find, 
award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the 
plaintiff therefor* 
/td^^^^ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. il 
In fixing damages, the law allows you to fix a sum that will 
reasonably compensate plaintiff for any past physical pain, as well as pain 
that is reasonably certain to be suffered in the future as a result of the 
defendant's wrongdoing. 
There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure the money 
equivalent of this element of injury; the only real measuring stick, if it can 
be so described, is your collective enlightened conscience. You should 
consider all the evidence bearing on the nature of the injuries, the certainty 
of future pain and the likely duration thereof. 
In this difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of 
injury that does not readily lend itself to an evaluation in terms of money, 
you should try to be as objective, calm and dispassionate as the situation will 
permit, 
14H 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2{ 
In assessing damage, you may determine if plaintiff has lost, or is 
reasonably likely to lose, profits from the interruption or destruction of an 
established business, and that the amount of such loss or future losses can, 
from the evidence, be estimated with reasonable certainty, you may include this 
loss in determining the damage, if any, to be awarded. Ordinarily, unless the 
business was an established business at the time of the wrong, this item should 
not be considered because the possiblity of any such profits would be too 
speculative and conjectural to be reasonably susceptible of evaluation; the 
evidence should be enough to show that the business had been successfully 
operated for a time long enough to give it recognition as a profitable entity 
and that these profits can be estimated with reasonable certainty. 
A ~n 
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INSTRUCTION NO • Mil 
The amount of damages fox any loss to be suffered in the 
future would not be the present payment of the total of such 
damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such 
future benefit. Therefore, in determining the present value of 
any future loss, you should calculate the same on the basis that 
any sum you might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom, 
and that all of it, except the amount currently needed to 
compensate for the loss sustained will be kept so invested as to 
yield the highest rate of interest consistent with current 
interest rates and reasonable security. The present value will 
be the sum which, when supplemented by such income from it, will 
equal the total of lost future benefits. 
/fa/w^"" z° 
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INSTRUCTION NO • 4 
In awarding damages, if any, in this case, you should be 
aware that the recovery of damages by the plaintiff in this case 
would not be taxed as income under federal or state tax laws. 
£/y&?s^. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. : c/h 
You are not permitted to award plaintiff speculative 
damages, by which term is meant compensation for detriment which 
is remote, conjectural or speculative. 
A r^  1 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
• i 
In this case you may not include in any award to plaintiff 
any sura for the purpose of punishing the defendants for the 
public good or to prevent other accidents. Such damages would be 
punitive rather than compensatory, and the law does not authorize 
punitive damages in this action. 
tffltfayid^ « 
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INSTRUCTION NO .4T 
The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by 
resort to chance. If you should decide that any party is 
entitled to recover, in discussing the amount of damages to be 
awarded, you properly could ascertain from each juror his own 
independent judgment as to what the amount should be — if you 
should so wish t.o do — whereupon, it would be your duty to 
thoughtfully consider the amounts so suggested, to test them in 
the light of the law and the evidence, and, after deliberation 
thereon, to determine which, if any, of such individual estimates 
was proper. But it would be unlawful for you to agree in advance 
to take the independent estimate of each juror, then total such 
estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make such 
average the amount of your award. /A 
A Tl r\ 
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Rule 47 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 Ij 
i 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION correct, any error which prevents counsel from j 
Parties have a right to make objections to m a k i n S objections thereto is harmless error. J 
instructions so as to preserve challenges to j ? £ ^ 8 *nfhristen8en' n U t a h 2 d *> 3 5 4 P 2 d 1 
their accuracy. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 5 t l ; / 7 r
 w „ - c o c 0 O J . . .
 ! 
2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). , tn ^ f o ^ * V' ^ ^ 
But refusal of right harmless if instruc- ( U t a n i y b U 
tions are correct If the instructions are <-. . 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of Jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attor-
neys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their 
attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is mate-
rial and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional 
questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition 
to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alter-
nate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior 
to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified 
to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, 
shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination 
and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, 
powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate juror who 
does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is 
entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. 
The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate 
juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not be used 
against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge Defined, By Whom Made. A challenge is an objection made to 
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. a 
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. J1 
(d) Challenge to Panel; Time and Manner of Taking; Proceedings. A chal-
lenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms i 
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the inten- ^ 
tional omission of the officer to summon one or more of the jurors drawn. It 
must be taken before the juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be noted by 
the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the ground 
of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the jury so 
far as the trial in question is concerned. Ij 
(e) Challenges to Individual Jurors; Number of Peremptory Challenges. The n 
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party 
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under U 
subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. ti 
80 
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Rule 47 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 
(f) Challenges for Cause; How Tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on 
one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and 
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident 
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or 
service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to such 
resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, 
or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a 
member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of 
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that 
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him-
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and 
any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge. 
(g) Selection of Jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
sutained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn 
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then 
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to.constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of Jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly 
try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered accord-
ing to the evidence and the instructions of th6 court. 
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Rule 47 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 
(i) Proceedings When Juror Discharged. If, after the impanelling of the jury 
and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty 
and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other 
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do 
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with 
a new jury. 
(j) View of Jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to 
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus 
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any 
subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of Jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during 
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by 
the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally sub-
mitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of Jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they 
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless 
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the verdict 
is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers Taken by Jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take 
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which 
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of such 
papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the person 
having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of the 
testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of them, 
but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional Instructions. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if 
there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they 
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may require 
the officer to conduct them into the court. Upon their being brought into court 
the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, 
the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or taken 
down by the reporter. 
(o) New Trial When No Verdict Given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court Deemed in Session Pending Verdict; Verdict May Be Sealed. While 
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to 
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Rule 47 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause 
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The 
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court, 
in case of an agreement during a recess or actfournment for the day. 
(q) Declaration of Verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such 
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule 
48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names 
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must 
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury, 
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may require the 
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror 
if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient 
number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again; 
otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the 
cause. 
(r) Correction of Verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, 
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may 
be sent out again. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Examination. 
III. Challenges for Cause. 
IV. View By Jury. 
V. Deliberations. 
VI. Papers Taken By Jury. 
VII. Additional Instructions. 
VIII. No Verdict. 
IX. Declaration of Verdict. 
X. Correction of Verdict. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Cited in Arellano v. Western Pac. R.R., 5 
Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527 (1956); Johnson v. 
Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); 
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 
942 (1970); State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1974). 
II. EXAMINATION 
Trial judge has wide discretion in con-
duct of voir dire. A trial judge has con-
siderable latitude of discretion as to manner 
and form in which he will conduct a voir dire 
examination to determine the qualifications of 
jurors. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Marriott, 21 
Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968). 
HI. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE 
Acquaintance with or engaging in same 
business as party not grounds for chal-
lenge. Challenges for cause on the grounds that 
jurors were either acquainted with the defen-
dant or engaged in same business pursuits as 
defendant did not fall within the grounds speci-
fied in subdivision (f) and were properly denied. 
C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29 Utah 
2d 353, 509 P.2d 821 (1973). 
Requiring use of peremptory chal lenges 
instead of granting challenge for cause 
affects rights. Forcing a party to use his 
peremptory challenges to strike jurors who 
should have been stricken for cause denies the 
litigant a substantial right. Jenkins v. Parrish, 
627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981).. 
IV. VIEW BY JURY 
In an eminent domain action, jury may 
view property even though there were sub-
stantial changes to the property during con-
struction, to see how the property was situated 
with respect to its surroundings. Utah State Rd. 
Comm'n v. Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 
57 (1968). 
V. DELIBERATIONS 
Jury verdict not impeachable on basis of 
deliberations. Generally a jury's verdict may 
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INSTRUCTION NO . 3 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because 
you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn 
duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law without 
regard to sympathy, passion, or prejudice. 
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INSTRUCTION NO •4-
Remember, the lawyers aren't on trial. Your feelings about 
them should not influence your decision in this case. 
It is the duty of the attorney on each side of a case to 
object when the other side offers evidence which the attorney 
believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the 
reason for the objections, nor should you show bias against a |k 
party because his attorney has made objections. When objections 
are made, the court is called upon to determine whether the 
f 
offered evidence might be properly admitted. You are not to be 
concerned with the reasons for such rulings and are not to draw 
any inferences from them. Whether offered evidence is admissible 
or not is purely a question of law. In admitting evidence to 
which an objection is made, the Court does not determine what # 
i 
weight should be given to such evidence -, nor does it pass on the 
credibility of the witness. These are matters for your § 
determination. However, you are not to consider evidence offered 
but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the Court. As 
to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not 
conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection since these are matters of law not 
properly within your consideration. 
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INSTRUCTION NO •J± 
By a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is used in 
these instructions, is meant that which to your minds is of the 
greater weight. The evidence preponderates to the side which, to 
your minds, seems to be the most convincing and satisfactory. 
The preponderance of the evidence is not alone determined by the 
number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but the 
convincing character of the testimony weighed by the impartial 
minds of the jury. 
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